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TRANSNATIONALIZING CAPITALIST HEGEMONY: A POULANTZIAN 
READING 
 
The global political economy is increasingly underpinned by transnationalizing social and 
class forces that exercise their interests utilizing nation states and institutions. Whereas the 
previous ‘world economy’ was typified by interactions between distinct national economies, in 
the current ‘global economy,’ service and production chains are ever more transnationalizing. 
In some readings, the notion of a ‘transnational state’ has been advanced, with the state having 
broken out of its national limitations. The transnational state thesis however is a concept too 
far. It denies the critical role played by the state in the globalization process. Utilising 
Poulantzas’ notion of an interior bourgeoisie, an alternative framework is offered that gives 
us an insight into the ongoing transnationalizing processes that mark the current contemporary 
stage of capitalism, but which still allows conceptual space for the role of class forces within 
state entities. 
 
Dominant interpretations of global politics are generally understood in terms of the competition 
among and between nation-states for status and power in an anarchic inter-state system. The 
material wealth of individual states is often understood to be at the foundation of such power 
and standing. Many of the commentators who think about these processes, however, are 
hindered by an ontology that not only links state power with national accounts (GDP above all 
other indicators), but also calculates trade, shares of world manufacturing etc. as if the global 
economy consisted of nationally discrete political economies. There are two problems with this 
approach. Firstly, such quantitative indicators are abstractions and serve to obfuscate class 
relations and the modes of production within given historical circumstances.1 Secondly, the 
globalization of capital over the recent decades has made such methodologies and research foci 
problematic.2 Both critiques are important given the context of dominant approaches within 
International Relations that on the one hand, dismiss the state as irrelevant and on the other, 
reify the state as the vehicle to navigate the global anarchical regime.   
 An alternative perspective that recognizes such limitations is thus called for. It is the 
argument of this article that the world must be seen in terms of transnationalizing social and 
class forces that exercise their interests utilizing nation states and institutions. In this scenario, 
inter-state dynamics and even inter-ruling class tensions do of course exist, but it is important 
to move beyond the external trends that are most visible in such frictions to arrive at the 
fundamental kernel of class forces in the global political economy and how these dynamics are 
demonstrated throughout the inter-state structure.3  
Whereas the previous “world economy” was typified by interactions between distinct 
national economies, with American companies owned by American investors producing for 
the world market, in the current “global economy” service and production chains are ever more 
transnationalizing. However, the notion of a “transnational state” as advanced by Stephen Gill 
and (particularly) William I. Robinson in his global capitalism thesis does not adequately 
describe ongoing processes. 4  Both scholars assert that as economic activity has become 
increasingly organized globally, the state has broken out of its national limitations and become 
transnationalized, carrying out the same role that it did post-1945 but now organizing capitalists 
and capital accumulation at a transnational level. This idea of a transnational state is a concept 
too far. As Bob Jessop notes, the idea of an effective transnational state would contain an 
intolerable economism that denied the vital political mediation of the internationalization 
process, as well as the political overdetermination of the state’s functions.5 This article thus 
seeks to offer an alternative framework. 
 
SOCIAL FORMATIONS AND THE TRANSNATIONALIZING RULING CLASSES 
Institutionalised spaces must not be scrutinized merely as states negotiating improved positions 
in the ongoing order. Rather, they are—like all states—social formations. Their policy 
preferences stem from the nature of their state–society complexes and cannot be separated from 
this. Whilst capitalism pushes for an elimination of boundaries and the ‘annihilation of space 
by time’,6 it inescapably needs as an interim measure, expressed through institutions and 
infrastructures. In this light, it is true that ruling classes have been progressively integrated into 
transnationalizing class structures and have increasingly been incorporated into the global 
institutions and infrastructures that have been erected to govern the world and provide 
facilitating conditions for the reproduction of capital. Policy elites have progressively entered 
the ranks of the transnationalizing ruling classes, although this process is ongoing and 
incomplete and contra the transnational capitalist class thesis, this has not been incompatible 
with state sovereignty and territoriality.7 Although this fraction does not generally admit itself 
as a class per se, it has realized a distinctive class consciousness, with an ‘awareness of a 
common concern to maintain the system that enables the class to remain dominant’.8  
This scenario follows on from the conditions of globalization, whereby discrete states 
are ever more having to transform and restructure themselves, with leading class fractions 
becoming more and more externally integrated into the global political economy. National 
states are not external to the ongoing process of the transnationalization of the state system, but 
have become increasingly incorporated into it as component parts. Indeed, they have been 
central to this process. This tilts the balance of power in favor of the transnationalizing 
hegemonic class elite and externally-oriented class fractions who push for the concomitant 
policies that serve and are inextricably bound up with the ongoing world order.  
However, it is clear that the nation state has not simply become a transmission belt for 
global capital (as Robert Cox avers) nor that the circuit of capital has transcended entirely the 
nation state. Indeed, a key critique of the global capitalist thesis is that it disregards possibilities 
of spatially-based logics to capital accumulation and also misses the reality that classes are 
created by the exploitative relations inherent in capitalism, which starts out—and often 
remains—at the national or regional level.9 And of course: 
The transformations of capitalist relations of production leave their mark on 
transformations of the nation and of bourgeois nationalism. Now, even in the current 
phase characterized by internationalization of capital, the (no doubt altered) modern 
nation remains for the bourgeoisie the focal point of its own reproduction — 
reproduction which takes the precise form of internationalization or 
transnationalization of capital.10 
 
Whilst nascent transnationalizing power blocs seek ever more globalization in terms of 
production and the accumulation of capital, the degree to which this occurs across time and 
space is necessarily dependent upon the balance of class forces in particular geographic entities. 
This can vary across time and space and the global polity is uneven and disjointed. The work 
of Nicos Poulantzas proffers some help in untangling this theoretical conundrum (whilst 
equally recognizing that the concept of imperialism and hierarchy still has purchase in its 
contemporary form). According to Poulantzas, internationalization is the latest stage of 
imperialism whilst inter-imperialist contradictions remain: 
A new dividing line is…being drawn within the metropolitan camp, between the United 
States on the one hand, and the other imperialist metropolises, in particular Europe, on 
the other. Relations between the imperialist metropolises themselves are now also being 
organized in terms of a structure of domination and dependence within the imperialist 
chain.11 
 
The contemporary global system is “essentially a response to the need for imperialist monopoly 
capital to turn to its account every relative advantage in the direct exploitation of labor”.12 In 
today’s world order, this occurs in the context of a transnationalization of the dominant 
capitalist state’s (i.e. the United States) state-society complex. Of course, the 
transnationalization of class relations has considerably intensified with the onset of 
globalization. This in practice has meant that the relationships between American-based capital 
and other capitals is now much more horizontal than previously, with emerging centers of 
accumulation clearly evident. Equally, the United State now also exhibits an internal 
bourgeoisie like other states in the global political economy, “because a massive influx of 
capital since the 1980s has changed the internal composition of the US capital considerably”.13 
A bourgeoisie with a compelling transnational orientation now holds the dominant position 
within the American power bloc. 
According to Poulantzas, the state systematizes the interests of the power bloc as it is 
relatively autonomous from specific class fractions, but this project is at the same time 
problematic due to the class contradictions and competitions within states, given that the state 
is not a monolithic entity but rather a field upon which such conflict is exercised.14 Thus the 
state at once constructs the necessary conditions for a dominant class and procures the consent 
of subaltern classes to govern, but this moment is never set in stone. The state as an institution 
is “destined to reproduce class divisions [and] is not, and can never be, a monolithic bloc 
without cracks, whose policy is established, as it were, in spite of its own contradictions”.15 
This can be most graphically seen in recent months with the rise of Donald Trump and an 
ostensible populism as well as with Brexit, which saw arguably saw a conflict between pro-
European integrationist neoliberal expressions and a more national form and/or a fraction more 
Atlanticist in orientation. Clearly, “transnationalised state projects can be resisted and contested 
by other fractions of capital and other social forces, and may confront challenges from state 
institutions and policies that are legacies of past social compromises”.16 Thus the idea that a 
transnational capitalist class exists (or can exist) as a unified bloc cannot be accepted, as it 
underestimates the horizontal socio-economic and political competitiveness and contestations 
between individual capitals. Despite the global hegemony of neoliberalism, the contradictory 
nature of the state makes certain that inter-imperialist rivalry will continue, rather than it being 
supplanted by a coherent transnational capitalist class or Ultraimperialismus (see below). As 
has been noted: 
“Transnational” elites indeed attempt to implement an international ‘neoliberal’ 
ideology, but are themselves not independent from the national level (or from local and 
macro-regional levels); for one, because they must repeatedly enter into national 
compromises with other actors (for example with capital fractions whose sphere of 
interest are limited to state territory or other subnational spaces), and for another, 
because the trend towards globalization has its limits.17  
 
Of course, the transnationalizing hegemonic class has been the active agents of neoliberal 
globalization. Here, Poulantzas’ internal bourgeoisie representing on the domestic scene the 
corporate power of international interests is of note.18 
 
THE INTERNAL BOURGEOISIE 
Poulantzas sought to ascertain the link between territorial fragmentation and the ongoing 
internationalization of production by developing the idea of the internal bourgeoisie. This was 
a break from previous conceptualizations of the domestic capitalist class which had delimited 
them to either the “comprador bourgeoisie” (essentially dependent agents of foreign capital 
with no productive base of their own),19 and the national bourgeoisie, who did possess a 
material base (albeit often protected from the demands of the population by imperialist 
interests, given that this bourgeoisie, through its control of the state, provided monopoly 
conditions for expansion).20 This national bourgeoisie was broadly assumed to share basic 
nationalistic views about industrialization, national development and growth. With shifting 
developments within the capitalist core, Poulantzas argued that this dichotomy was no longer 
satisfactory: 
What is necessary, then, is to introduce a new concept enabling us to analyze the 
concrete situation, at least that of the bourgeoisies of the imperialist metropolises in 
their relationship with American capital. Provisionally, and for want of a better word, I 
shall use the term ‘internal bourgeoisie.’ This bourgeoisie, which exists alongside 
sectors that are genuinely comprador, no longer possesses the structural characteristics 
of a national bourgeoisie, though the extent of this of course differs from one imperialist 
formation to another.21  
 
This internal bourgeoisie denoted the emerging and relatively autonomous fraction of capital 
which was already infused by “external” capital so that there was no longer a dominant fraction 
of the domestic ruling classes which was able to continue the accumulation process bound 
within the constricted confines of national markets. 22  Under conditions of neoliberal 
globalization, the more dependent countries become on foreign capital, the more pitiless must 
the state be in favoring the extant privileged minority who possess considerable assets. As 
noted, “Their interests are always the same: low inflation, stable external value of their 
currency, and minimum taxation of their investment income…[Yet the] financial short-circuit 
between different countries forces them into a competition to lower taxes, to reduce public 
expenditure, and to renounce the aim of social equality”.23 
Multifaceted symbiotic relations with capital based in the North has led to a wearing 
down of ideological independence (which has then translated into policy preferences—see 
below). However, because the internal bourgeoisie do possess their own economic base, a base 
which is not characteristic of a national bourgeoisie in that it has international ambitions and 
interests, interactions with foreign fractions of capital are complicated and more equivocal than 
either the comprador or national bourgeoisies, albeit dependent upon the national peculiarities 
of each individual state.24 Poulantzas argued that the Western European bourgeoisies (which 
was the focus of his study) were dependent on United States capital, but in ways which were 
qualitatively different from that previously witnessed between compradors and American (or 
foreign in general) capital. Here it should be noted that Poulantzas never suggested that the 
interior bourgeoisie were a unified class.25 Although they may display a degree of political 
agreement at times when contradictions exist between them and foreign capital, “it is itself 
deeply divided, particularly in so far as it is cleft by the contradiction between monopoly and 
non-monopoly capital, and this fact is not without effect on its political weakness”.26 
 
THE DUAL STATUS 
How Poulantzas’ work relates to the transnationalising thesis is the way in which his analysis 
of the dominant class under conditions of global capitalism allows them to assert their dual 
status as both autonomous and dependent upon imperial capital. This is because: 
As an effect of the globalization of capital valorization, the internal bourgeoisies have 
been transnationalized: they have interiorized transnational capital and, with it, 
transnational power relations. It follows that the national states have been 
transnationalized, too. This does not mean, however, that they have lost their political 
importance: they remain an important terrain for the reproduction of the respective 
transnationalized bourgeoisies, which is why the latter remain internal bourgeoisies.27 
 
This transnationalizing internal bourgeoisie have sought to effect neoliberalism at the national 
level, thereby effecting a globalizing trend.  
Yet because uneven development is writ large across the globe, there are substantial 
structural limits on the possibilities of the elaboration of a transnational state which is at the 
heart of the global capitalism thesis. Additionally, the dominant power bloc within nation states 
possess strategic preferences vis-à-vis which particular institutions (up to and including those 
of the state) it can most efficiently influence to promote its collective material interests. 
However, the contradictory characteristics of these institutions can also stimulate competitions 
among and between capitalist states as much as construct a cohesive transnational capitalism. 
The question is entirely empirical and contingent and different outcomes will necessarily arise 
from different configurations and moments.  
The transnationalizing forces working on a state then will always be reflective of 
conflicts around the precise condensations of national and supranational institutions that 
embody global capitalism, rather than a fundamental evolution in the nature of the state. The 
hegemony of neoliberalism and the transnationalizing process notwithstanding, class 
contradictions will always remain and the nation state will be the primary terrain where such 
contradictions are resolved. This survives even when we have moved from the international 
(processes across borders) to the transnationalizing (processes both across borders and 
functional integration).  
Complex structures of ownership now characterize transnational corporations and 
whilst the class interests of the global plutocracy have shifted beyond merely that of a national 
bourgeoisie, the national foundation remains within the context of broader and determinant 
formations like national states and cultures. The nation-state and those operative through it 
remain essential for the functioning of global capitalism. It is absolutely true that functionally 
integrated circuits of production and finance exist and these are often supranational. It is 
equally true that many pivotal economic, social, and political processes have become 
transnationally-oriented. But these are all permitted by the agglomeration of national-based 
power blocs who view such processes as beneficial to themselves and their class interests i.e. 
the internal bourgeoisie (even whilst having to resolve the contradictions that such processes 
generate at the domestic level): ‘There is no capitalism without the state. Capitalist 
globalization could not be pursued without the interventions of the United States armed forces 
and the management of the dollar’.28 
As relatively autonomous these ruling classes assiduously construct hegemony even 
while operating in the “collective” interests of capital. Externally-oriented fractions accept as 
true the idea that for their spatial entity to “progress”, they must continue to insert their 
economies into ongoing global circuits of accumulation. Yet the internal bourgeoisie are still 
beholden to their domestic constituencies (even in autocratic formations). This power bloc 
necessarily interacts with a multiplicity of social forces, some more transnationally-oriented 
than others. As a result, political rhetoric and policies may transpire that appear to contradict 
the hegemony of neoliberalism. Yet the fundamentals of the world order will not be challenged 
unless a momentous change in the balance of class forces occurs. All the while, the United 
States as ultimate guarantor for conditions advantageous for transnationalizing capital remains. 
This can be seen by American policy practice: 
[W]hen the US state acts it is because of the structural power of the US economy within 
world capitalism, with transnational outcomes primarily benefitting US capital through 
the US’ preponderance of global market power. Thus the US state acts to secure the 
generic global conditions for transnational capital accumulation less at the behest of a 
TCC (transnational capitalist class), but rather because, in so doing, the US state is, by 
default, acting in the generic interest of its national capital because of its high level of 
internationalization. In short, the US state is the first among capitalist equals.29 
 
As global capitalism has advanced, it necessarily seeks to create a world order amenable to 
accumulation on a global scale. The class agents of this enterprise have increasingly risen to 
the fore and may be seen as the hegemonic fraction of capital on a world scale. Although the 
state is constituted politically on a national basis, its class character is not simply defined in 
national terms as the capitalist law of property and contract ever more transcend national legal 
systems and finance transcends the restrictions of national currencies. 
This transnationalizing internal bourgeoisie is ever more connected to global circuits of 
production, marketing and finance. What can be witnessed is a new set of social formations 
articulated via class struggles among and between discrete fractions of capital i.e. (national and 
transnational. 30  What distinguishes the transnationalizing internal bourgeoisie is that its 
members seek opportunities across state borders to further their collective interests (which is 
never complete and at times contradictory). In its extreme, this class, which Samuel 
Huntingdon dubbed ‘Davos Man’ “ha[s] little need for national loyalty, view[s] national 
boundaries as obstacles that thankfully are vanishing, and see[s] national governments as 
residues from the past whose only useful function is to facilitate the elite’s global operations.”31  
David Harvey has suggested that though this process has been efficiently camouflaged, 
recent decades have witnessed a spectacular class struggle whereby the ruling class has restored 
or, as in China and Russia and other emerging powers, constructed class domination after a 
hiatus of compromise and (in the West), embedded liberalism. 32  Warren Buffet (third 
wealthiest individual in the world in 2015) agrees with this, asserting that “There’s class 
warfare, all right but it’s my class, the rich class, that’s making war, and we’re winning”.33 
This transnationalizing class fraction’s progressive disconnection from national roots (though 
not final) is evident because: 
[E]ven when they maybe located nationally (e.g. primarily operating within one nation 
state but physically domiciled in a number of different homes), internationally (e.g. 
using limited national market integration) or indeed transnationally (e.g. using global 
productive product chains), part of their investments, if not all of them, are likely to be 
liquid and located globally. This [fraction] operate[s] in this increasingly 
transnationalizing world, where capital penetrates all global regions and all nation 
states, operating with and through loose transnational networks of state apparatus that 
function to facilitate capital accumulation, maintain and sustain the top-of-the-top 1 
percent’s class power.34 
 
The erstwhile hegemony of an essentially nation-based capitalist class has been elevated to the 
global scale by this transnationalizing class, the fraction with the greatest influence on 
international institutions and which today has an increasing say in the running of nations. This 
process has gone hand in hand with increasing global inequality, as many have noticed.35 Half 
of all global wealth now rests in the hands of 1 percent of the world’s population, according to 
investment bank Credit Suisse, which also warned that the world’s wealthiest 1 percent would 
own more than the rest put together by 2016.36 
The current global order then may be best described as a plutocracy where power 
resides with a transnationalizing “superclass” of the 1%37 What is absolutely crucial is that this 
plutocracy subscribes to a conspicuous ideology that brings with it an activist globalizing 
perspective, seeking to topple the legal, social, ideological, and cultural barriers to continued 
capital accumulation by “going global”, facilitating their mega-accumulation strategies. 
Capital has sought to shake off the mere constraints of nation-state capitalism and has worked 
towards breaking free of the compromises and concessions that had been formerly agreed with 
the working classes. This is still contingent however on the compromises and competitions at 
the national scale.  
The transnationalizing internal bourgeoisie embodies the dominant fraction among the 
capitalist classes. They are not simply “the elites” (although they are elite in the sense that they 
constitute the ruling class). They are the leading fractions of a particular class—those defined 
by their relationship to the means of global production and/or to global finance. 38  The 
transnationalizing internal bourgeoisie then is a class which is emerging through their discrete 
practices embedded in a globalized economy in a period of intensive financialization. Their 
class power is ever more explained in relation to their ownership and control of the means of 
production, operating within the structural field of the circuits of capital which are ever more 
transnationalising. 39  Whilst Leslie Sklair attributes roles to the members of this class 
(transnational executives and their affiliates; globalizing state bureaucrats; capitalist-inspired 
politicians and professionals; and consumerist elites) these functions may overlay with their 
defined class position and they are not definitional.40 They are in fact are social categories, 
rather than reflecting a class position. However, whilst acknowledging the above processes, it 
is too far a conceptual leap to advocate the existence of a transnational state.   
 
A TRANSNATIONALIZING INTERNAL BOURGEOISIE, NOT A 
TRANSNATIONAL STATE 
The idea of a transnational state owes its intellectual origins to Karl 
Kautsky’s Ultraimperialismus whereby competition between states was to be broadly ended 
by a cartel relationship that united the interests of the ruling classes.41 Indeed, “It is…the notion 
of ‘ultraimperialism’ that identifies the hegemony of one imperialist country over others with 
a compete ‘pacification’ of inter-imperialist contradictions”.42 Kautsky essentially argued that 
core capitalist states would avoid competition—and the inevitable wars between imperialist 
powers—by entering into a new epoch where monopoly capital had reached such a high stage 
that it could organize the joint exploitation of the global economy. Such a cartel would allow 
the capitalist countries to maintain profits and avoid stagnation. In this stage of ultra-
imperialism, international class coalitions and cooperation (as well as the need to subsume 
contradictions and antipathies) would be harmonized. Of course, Vladimir Lenin sharply 
critiqued Kautsky’s thesis, arguing that capitalism was in a transition process towards the 
monopoly stage.43 From being a nation-based system, Lenin argued that capitalism had evolved 
into an imperialist stage typified by monopolistic/oligopolistic conglomerates i.e. the 
monopoly stage of capitalism. As the advanced capitalist nations entered into fierce 
competition, the interests of the dominant classes crossed and diverged, inevitably resulting in 
wars over foreign resources and markets. For Lenin, imperialism but was a superstructure of 
capitalism.  
Both Kautsky and Lenin aimed at expanding Marx’s analysis of domestic nation-based 
capitalism to the international level of economic interactions between industrial states. It might 
be averred that whilst ultra-imperialism as a concept may be treated with caution, the Kautsky-
Lenin debate is quite apposite for today’s globalized world. Indeed, whilst Kautsky’s notion of 
ultra-imperialism has not been realized, transnationalizing capitalism in terms of the mutual 
interests of finance capital across the world is developing, ever more incorporating hegemonic 
fractions from both the North and the South. And Lenin’s understanding of the crisis of 
monopoly capitalism, where corporations are integrated with finance capital, communicates in 
important ways the contemporary and ongoing global situation. The main divergence is in the 
distinction made regarding imperialism. Kautsky saw it as a particular policy of capitalism to 
overcome inter-core contradictions in the epoch of finance capital whilst ‘Lenin’s imperialism 
propose[d] the concept of a new stage of capitalism as the solution to the theoretical crisis 
within Marxism that emerged with capitalist recovery at the turn of the 20th century’.44  
Yet at the current level of capitalist development it is a step too far to claim that we 
have arrived at ultra-imperialism and a transnational state (or even cartel). Admittedly, one can 
see the logic behind the argument. For instance, in one of the first theorizations regarding the 
emergence of a transnational capitalist class, Friedland asserted that it followed that some new 
state form would emerge to perform the role of the “executive committee” of a new 
transnational bourgeoisie.45 But this is not the case and this seemingly logical step ignores the 
resilience of nation states, which has been addressed in a different way by Weiss.46 Both Gill’s 
and Robinson’s theorizations of global capitalism mirror Leslie Sklair’s ideas about a putative 
transnational capitalist class.47 However, they take this one step further, with Stephen Gill 
arguing that at globalization’s core is an increasingly dominant fraction of the capitalist class, 
namely, large-scale financial investors and transnational corporations that control immense 
amounts of the global economy and that are the main powers in global trade and the financial 
markets. These push for a reconfiguration of the state viz. the creation of a transnational state 
apparatus.48  
We can certainly agree that “we need to expunge state centrism from our paradigms 
and shift the level of analysis from nation-state capitalism in an inter-state system to global 
capitalism and an ongoing process of capitalist class formation across countries and regions.”49 
However, where we must part company with the transnational state thesis is when claims are 
made that states already act as transmission belts for the spreading of global capital and that 
national states are mere “filtering devices” in pressing forward the agenda of monopoly 
capitalism. This is practically the same as arguing that the old capitalism is no more and that 
an integral imperialism has emerged. Interestingly, Vladimir Lenin long argued that this was 
impossible:   
Pure imperialism, without the fundamental basis of capitalism, has never existed, does 
not exist anywhere and will never exist…Nowhere in the world has monopoly 
capitalism existed in a series of branches, without free competition, nor will it exist.50 
 Indeed, “the transnational state thesis…offers a flattened ontology that removes state forms as 
a significant spatial scale in the articulation of capitalism, levels out the spatial and territorial 
logics of capital accumulation, and elides the class struggles extant in specific locations”.51 
Globalization and the increasing transnationalization of production chains does not imply that 
modes of production take place in a transterritorialized class vacuum. In fact, capitalist 
exploitation must always take place somewhere i.e. in a spatial location, which given the 
current global order, means within the territories of sovereign states.52  As Achin Vanaik 
reminds us, the nation-state remains important: 
TNCs have their ‘home’ bases where the most powerful economic levers of research 
and financial control reside, and where the links to ‘their’ state can provide the most 
powerful political levers to serve their company interests. This means that inter-capital 
rivalries and tensions will to some degree translate into inter-state rivalries and tensions 
that could add to already existing tensions deriving from historical territorial disputes 
or from geopolitical needs or from ideological differences. Since such inter-state 
rivalries are far more dangerous and potentially de-stabilizing than rivalries between 
capitals, they must somehow be managed and defused.53 
 
Neoliberal globalization and the development of new transnationalizing social forces have thus 
not led to the emergence of a transnational state. This is because were this to happen, it would 
require a unified class consciousness that brings about a global comprehensive concept of 
control which in turn assumes a state-like global apparatus and (crucially) an international 
terrain where competition had been overcome. 54  This is improbable because despite 
transnationalizing processes, the national basis of power cannot be ignored: capital, no matter 
how internationalized it is in form and character, does not lose its “national” identity.55 As the 
European Union demonstrates, even when the internal bourgeoisie is strongly transnationalized 
and in favor of a super-state that elides national sovereignty, the contestations and 
contradictions within each national space mean that this is a utopian project (in the European 
Union’s case, of possibly doubtful longevity).  
Rather, there has advanced a restructuring within various state formations of new 
relationships of social forces expressed through class struggles between fractions of capital and 
labor. Obviously, such processes are variegated across time and space. This emphasis on the 
internalization of class interests within the state, through a transnationalizing extension of 
social relations, is very different from arguing that states are now transmission belts from the 
global to the national level.56 Even in states where neoliberalism and transnationalization has 
arguably been deepest in its penetration, the nation-state still matters and “States…have 
demonstrated clear interests in capturing the benefits of deepening financial market integration 
without fundamentally compromising their ultimate political authority over the process”.57 It 
remains so that the persistent importance of territory administered by the state as the framework 
for capital accumulation and global power politics continues.58 
There is certainly an interpenetration of national capitals and greater and greater 
interaction and cooperation between and among leaders of the transnationalizing capitalist class 
based in different states. These connections replicate the restructuring of thinking vis-à-vis the 
global economy from a primarily international economy approach of competition for colonies 
and export markets as well as sources of raw materials (ever present in the history of capitalism) 
to thinking about the globalized world economy in terms where the home country is one market 
among many others. Profit maximization is of course globally organized, but state power over 
different facets of territorial integrity is not cheerfully given up.59 
Of course, transnational capital seeks to place itself above the nation-state towards 
which it “tends to take an instrumental and conflicting attitude—‘instrumental’ because it seeks 
to bend the state to its own interests…‘conflicting’ because the shift of its interests into a global 
space generates difficulties in national economies”.60  But national states still provide the 
necessary mechanisms and take charge of the interests of the imperialist capital in its 
development within the ‘national’ social formation as Poulantzas noted. Indeed on the material 
level, deregulation, labor fragmentation, productivity and profit maximization can only be 
ensured within a juridical territorial context that is national. In this sense, far from dispensing 
with national states’ functions and services, the extended reproduction of the accumulation of 
international capital is totally dependent on their constant intervention.61 As Jerry Harris notes: 
Although capitalist expansion has led to a transnational economic system, this doesn’t 
mean that all national forms and expressions of capital have been swept away. As with 
the century-long development of industrial capitalism, transnational capitalism is 
undergoing an extended process of consolidation. Each country assimilates into global 
production, finance and governance at its own pace, determined by many historical and 
cultural factors. Consequently, national rivalries can still be expressed on the 
international political stage.62 
 
The way transnational capitalism is reproduced within institutionalized spaces changes these 
state forms in the process. Power blocs are not limited to the purely national level but instead, 
global contradictions are reproduced within each “national” power bloc, national state and 
wider state-society complex. The interests of foreign capital are represented by certain fractions 
of the interior bourgeoisies within the power bloc and also have access, through divergent 
channels, to the state apparatus.63 As Poulantzas noted, at a time when American fractions of 
the transnationalizing bourgeoisie were arguably dominant: 
The modifications of the role of the European national states in order to assume 
responsibility for the international reproduction of capital under the domination of 
American capital and the political and ideological conditions of this reproduction bring 
about decisive transformations of these state apparatuses.64 
 
Thus, the state has to intercede between the peculiar interests of competing class fractions of 
capital, which may encompass policies that may go against the concerns of a particular fraction, 
the goal being the securing of capitalist relations in the medium- to long-term. Additionally, 
those who control the state organize hegemony by imposing certain concessions and sacrifices 
on the dominant classes in order to reproduce long-term domination. “The state concentrates 
not only the relationship of forces between fractions of the power bloc, but also the relationship 
between that bloc and the dominated classes”.65 
The argument underpinning the transnational state thesis appears to stem from the 
common interpretation of the most familiar of all the Marxist formulations on the state, that 
which is to be found in the Communist Manifesto, where Marx and Engels asserted that the 
modern state was merely a committee for overseeing the shared interests of the  bourgeoisie.66 
This has regularly been interpreted as meaning not only that the state acts on behalf of the 
dominant class, but that it also acts at the bidding of that class, which is quite different. The 
notion of common affairs presupposes the actuality of particular ones whilst the notion of the 
whole bourgeoisie suggests that there exists separate elements which constitute that whole. 
This being so, there is a recognizable need for an organization of the kind Marx and Engels 
refer to (i.e. the state). This state cannot meet these aforementioned needs without possessing 
a certain degree of autonomy. Thus, the concept of autonomy is itself entrenched in the 
definition of the capitalist state itself.  
What this means is that the state, then, is not a simple class instrument or a subject, or 
“thing” that directly represents the interests of dominant classes. It is not a mere transmission 
belt and the dominant classes consist of several class fractions that constitute the state. Indeed, 
the state is the concentration of various relations between classes and class fractions within the 
state apparatus.67 It is true that states may be structurally biased in favor of powerful sections 
of society, yet a certain autonomy and set of general functions exist which cannot be reducible 
to claims of serving specific class interests. The state then enjoys a relative autonomy with 
respect to these classes and fractions of classes and outcomes are dependent on specific 
moments and the balance of class forces. 68  Yet, lest the meaning of this phrase is 
misunderstood, it should be made clear that relative autonomy does not mean a distancing from 
capitalist social relations of production. Rather, that the state experiences relative autonomy 
vis-à-vis the classes and fractions of classes that support it.69 
The emergence of transnational class fractions does of course lead to various forms of 
state restructuring, which is essentially what we may dub the neoliberal counter-revolution 
against welfarist compromises. These transnationalizing class forces of capital do not challenge 
the state as an outside agent (“the transnational state”), but are intimately enmeshed in the 
continuous class struggles over the dominant hegemonic project within the nation-state 
configuration. The precise manner by which this all plays out and the degree to which 
transnationalizing interests are adopted within specific state formations requires close analysis 
and will obviously differ from state to state according to the diverse relationships of social 
forces and the different institutional arrangements at the national level, which themselves are 
expressions of the diverse historical paths which each state formation has experienced. This 
“needs to be taken into account when analyzing the internal relations between the inter-state 
system and globalisation”.70 
 
CONCLUSION 
A key problem with the transnational state thesis is that the specific historicities of each 
national state and the social formations that constitute these are merged into one entity: “the 
state”. This violates Marx’s own assertion that: 
Nature does not produce on the one hand owners of money or commodities, and on the 
other hand men possessing nothing but their own labor-power...It is clearly the result 
of a past historical development, the product of many economic revolutions, of the 
extinction of a whole series of older formations of social production.71  
 
Quite obviously, economic relations cannot be abstracted from their social and historical 
settings and the broader interests they serve.  
Thus the task is not to investigate whether the inter-state system has been replaced by 
a transnational state, but to conceptualize the internal relationships between an enduring state-
system and an evolving global capitalism with regard to the current transnationalization of 
production processes.72 Indeed, the debate should be over the role that nation states play in 
promoting home-based capitalist interest. These are necessarily those with a global vision and 
reach and which are the most powerful in terms of political/economic influence. Thus 
determining decision-making processes and outcomes grounded upon the interests of a putative 
transnational capital class is different from whether an actual transnational state has emerged.73  
The transnational state thesis obfuscates class struggles and assumes an omnipotent 
capitalism (and omnipotent unified ruling class) which in some way demolishes national 
histories. The problem with this thesis is that such assertions ignore the different outcomes that 
different class struggles within different states have resulted in. What this means in practice is 
that divergent forms of transnationalizing ruling classes reformulate state-society complexes 
specific to the historical trajectories of spatial formations.74 Consequently, neoliberalism has 
come to be manifested in highly variegated forms which differ vis-à-vis the role of the state in 
the economy, capital and labor market regulations, etc. This all depends on previous 
institutional agreements, specific class alliances and social formations and of course, history.75  
Competition among capitalists continues, but now it also takes place among and 
between oligopolistic clusters in a transnational environment. All of this throws into sharp 
focus the competition between transnational corporations based in the United States, Europe, 
and Asia to increase and diversify their production networks, the effect of which is to bring 
spaces into an all-embracing framework of competition both within and between separate 
enterprises.76 In short, while we agree with focusing on transnationalizing capital and the class 
formations engendered by this, the idea of the transnational state is critiqued because it ignores 
the fact that states remain meaningful nodal points in the configuration of capitalist 
accumulation and because it fails to recognize the ongoing importance of how different 
expressions of capitalist development in its various stages is articulated between and within 
social formations. 
The stability of the current arrangement is however open to speculation. Neoliberalism 
was advanced as a strategy to break with the class compromises of Fordism. As its 
transnationalization has continued apace the relative balance of power between states and 
forces beyond the national space has shifted (even at the behest of the ruling classes). As the 
crisis of neoliberalism becomes ever more evident, the question of legitimacy has emerged, 
with elements railing against continuing “globalization”. Transnationalization has arguably 
undermined the relative autonomy of the state, resulting in conditions where state 
decisionmakers feel constrained—if not unable—to determine and follow through with long 
term strategies and policies to solve the crisis. Their autonomy is seemingly often inadequate 
in facing down powerful fractions pushing for ever more integration.77 The sort of intra-power 
bloc compromises necessary to craft a hegemonic project have been weakened by the 
imbalances in power as transnationalizing fractions have come to dominate the interior 
bourgeoisies of most industrial nations. As committed neoliberal ideologues have advanced the 
liberalization agenda further and further, a populist backlash, often couched in nationalist 
terms, has been engendered. How this develops in the future will likely have major implications 
for the global political economy.  
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